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We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, 
interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some 
production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between 
the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, unless the ex-post bargaining strength of 
the contest winner is sufficiently low and/or there are very few contestants. However, even in 
the case of two contestants, outsourcing reduces the procurement costs of inducing a given 
level of effort if the contest organizer can collect entry fees. With respect to contest design, 
this suggests that outsourcing should generally be allowed if the objective is to induce 
stronger competition. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
In many cases, competition between ﬁrms takes the form of a contest, where
ﬁrms spend resources in order to win a contested "prize". In this paper,
we analyze a situation where the allocation of a production contract is de-
termined in an imperfectly discriminating contest, where a given number of
potential suppliers exert sunk eﬀort in order to increase the probability of
being awarded the contract. The novel contribution of the paper is that we
allow for the possibility of ex-post horizontal outsourcing of production.1 We
analyze how such outsourcing possibilities aﬀect competition between ﬁrms
in the contest for the prime contract, and we also discuss implications for
contest design and social welfare.
There are several general examples of ﬁrm competition that ﬁt our con-
test set-up. Consider competition for big projects or large-scale production
contracts in the public procurement business, where the ﬁnal allocation of the
contract may crucially depend on diﬀerent types of sunk eﬀort undertaken
by competing suppliers in order to inﬂuence the buyer’s decision. For ex-
ample, a potential supplier might undertake investments in order to improve
the quality of his product and tailoring it to match the buyer’s needs and
requirements, thereby increasing the probability of being awarded the con-
tract. Furthermore, ﬁrms may also spend considerable resources on lobbying
— even direct bribes — in order to secure lucrative licences or contracts.2 Since
contracts might not be awarded to the most cost-eﬃcient ﬁrm, there could
be ex post incentives for horizontal outsourcing of production to ﬁrms with
lower production costs. Some striking anecdotal examples can be found in
the clean-up and reconstruction process after Hurricane Katrina in the US.
Critical questions have been raised about a number of no-bid and limited-
bid contracts which have been given to prime contractors who have allegedly
earned excessive proﬁts by subsequently subcontracting the work.3
1Horizontal outsourcing, where inputs or parts of the ﬁnal production of a good are
subcontracted to rival ﬁrms within the same industry, is a common phenomenon in many
industries (see, e.g., Kamien et al., 1989, Spiegel, 1993 and Chen et al., 2004, for further
discussions).
2See, e.g., Konrad (2000) for a further discussion.
3Perhaps one of the most controversial cases is the $40 million contract given to the
2Another ﬁtting example is R&D tournaments, where ﬁrms spend re-
sources on R&D in order to obtain a proﬁtable patent, licence or produc-
tion contract.4 An illustrative speciﬁc example is US defense procurement,
where the "prizes" of research contests held by the Department of Defense
are proﬁtable production contracts. Thus, the regulatory structures applies
well to the rent-seeking framework of a contest, as also argued by Rogerson
(1989). Furthermore, this industry is also characterized by a large extent of
post-award subcontracting between ﬁrms who were rivals in competition for
prime contracts (see, e.g., Alexander, 1997).
How is the possibility of ex post outsourcing likely to aﬀect ﬁrms’ choice
of contest eﬀort? We ﬁnd that outsourcing tends to increase eﬀort incen-
tives for high-cost ﬁrms, due to reduced eﬀective production costs, while the
most eﬃcient ﬁrm has reduced incentives, since this ﬁrm will expect to ap-
propriate part of the contested prize through ex post subcontracts in any
case. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the possibility of outsourcing will in-
crease total contest eﬀort unless there are very few contestants and the ex
post bargaining strength of the contest winner is suﬃciently low. If there is
free entry to the contest, outsourcing tends also to increase the number of
active contestants. These results shed some new light on the common view
of horizontal subcontracting as a collusive device. Collusion is not an issue
in the present paper, but our results show that competition may actually
increase from subcontracting between potential suppliers.5
What are the implications for optimal contest design?6 An R&D contest,
Alaskan-owned company Akima Site Operations for the supply of 450 portable classrooms
in Mississippi. The company had allegedly not been involved in similar activity before
and, therefore, had to rely on subcontracting. The controversy has been further spurred
by the strong lobbying connections of Akima’s parent company Nana (see, e.g., Lipton,
2005).
4See, e.g., Taylor (1995) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
5In a standard oligopoly model of international trade, Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
horizontal outsourcing has a collusive eﬀect that could raise prices, while Alexander (1997)
argues that subcontracts may help facilitate collusive bidding in prime contract auctions.
In a framework of strategic outsourcing — though vertical, rather than horizontal — Shy
and Stenbacka (2003) and Buehler and Haucaup (2006) all ﬁnd that outsourcing generally
softens competition.
6Several suggestions for designing a contest to achieve a speciﬁc objective have been
formulated in the contest literature, see, e.g., Baye et al. (1993), Fullerton and McAfee
3for instance, may very well arise naturally from, say, opportunities of mo-
nopolization and patent rights. In many other cases, however, there may be
a tournament sponsor initiating the contest. In the case where the prize is
an exclusive production contract, should the tournament sponsor allow the
winning ﬁrm to outsource production ex post? We argue that the decision
to allow or disallow outsourcing is not only a potentially eﬀective tool in
contest design, it is also a tool that seems easier to support in practice than
some of the other measures proposed in the literature.7. Indeed, practices on
these matters diﬀer, and while allowing outsourcing would probably raise no
eyebrows, neither would not accepting such schemes, since it can easily be
argued — as it frequently is — that this is needed to prevent the diﬀusion of
control and responsibility for the project in question.
If the aim of the contest designer is to maximize total eﬀort, our results
suggest — as indicated above — that outsourcing should be allowed in a ma-
jority of cases. A case to the contrary, though, is a situation with only two
contestants, where outsourcing will reduce total eﬀort if the contest winner
has suﬃciently low bargaining power in setting the terms of the subcon-
tract. However, we show that this latter result is overturned if the contest
administrator can also collect entry fees. For the case of two contestants, we
ﬁnd that outsourcing will always reduce procurement costs (i.e., the costs of
inducing a given level of eﬀort in the contest), which reinforces the policy
recommendation of allowing outsourcing.
From a viewpoint of social welfare, though, increased competition for win-
ning a contested prize might not always be desirable. In situations where a
considerable amount of contest eﬀort is resources spent on lobbying or bribes,
a social planner might want to introduce measures — such as regulation on
subcontracting — in order to reduce, for instance, the potential payoﬀ of cor-
(1999), Gradstein and Konrad (1999), Amegashie (1999,2000), Clark and Riis (2000) and
Szymanski and Valletti (2004).
7For instance, if the aim is to increase contest eﬀort, there may be a case for discrimi-
nating against the high-ability/low-cost contestants, by limiting their possibilities to win
the contest, in some cases excluding them from the contest altogether (see, e.g., Baye et
al., 1993, and Che and Gale, 2003). The aim is to level the playing ﬁeld and thus induce
higher eﬀort, but the approach is questionable when it comes to fair treatment in the more
common sense of the term.
4rupt behavior by government oﬃcials. To capture this possibility, we also
study the case where all contest eﬀort is considered socially wasteful. In this
case, social welfare is equivalent to aggregate proﬁts. Since our previously
discussed results suggested that outsourcing generally leads to increased ef-
fort, one might expect that outsourcing is welfare detrimental in these cases
if eﬀort is wasteful. However, since high-cost ﬁrms may be awarded the con-
tract if outsourcing is not allowed, outsourcing may increase aggregate ﬁrm
proﬁts even though rent-seeking expenditures increase.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper dealing with horizon-
tal outsourcing in a contest framework. However, the present paper relates
to several earlier contributions on horizontal outsourcing focusing on other
modes of competition. Kamien et al. (1989) analyze how the possibility
of ex post subcontracting aﬀects the initial competition for a contract in a
duopoly under price competition, where the incentive for outsourcing stems
from strictly convex production costs. Particular attention is directed to-
wards two polar cases, where either the winner or the loser of the initial
contract dictates the terms of the subcontract, and the authors ﬁnd that
competition is higher in the former case. An equivalent result is derived in
the present paper, although the framework is quite diﬀerent.
Spiegel (1993) analyses a duopoly situation which is quite similar to
Kamien et al. (1989), the important diﬀerence being that ﬁrms are assumed
to compete in quantities rather than prices.8 As in our model, but in con-
trast to Kamien et al. (1989), incentives for subcontracting arise from cost
asymmetries. Spiegel (1993) ﬁnds that ex post outsourcing is more likely to
increase social welfare if the subcontractor’s share of the outsourcing surplus
is relatively small. Unless contest eﬀort is socially wasteful, this result is also
reﬂected in the present analysis since, in our model, low bargaining strength
for the subcontractor tends to increase competition.
Another related paper is Gale et al. (2000), who consider a sequential
auction for multiple contracts with ex post subcontracting possibilities be-
tween the initial bidders. Once more, outsourcing incentives arise because
8Chen et al. (2004) also study horizontal outsourcing under Cournot competition, but
in a speciﬁc context of international trade.
5of cost asymmetries. The authors ﬁnd that the possibility of ex post out-
sourcing might make the sellers worse oﬀ ex ante. Although the framework is
quite diﬀerent from ours, this result reﬂects the situation with low bargaining
strength for the subcontractor in our model, where we show that outsourcing
might reduce ex ante aggregate proﬁts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we
present the benchmark model without outsourcing — a standard ﬁxed-prize
Tullock contest with asymmetric valuations. In Section 3 we introduce the
possibility of ex post outsourcing under the assumption of price competition
for the subcontract. In Section 4 we relax the assumption of price competition
and consider bilateral Nash bargaining as a mechanism for determining the
price of the subcontract. In Section 5 we discuss contest design and welfare,
while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2A b e n c h m a r k m o d e l
There are n ﬁrms participating in a contest for being awarded a contract
for the supply of a good with a gross value of V . Alternatively, the set-
up can be thought of as an R&D tournament, with n ﬁrms competing to
obtain a patent, license, production contract or simply a technological lead,
which generates a revenue of V . We assume initially that the ﬁrm that wins
the contest must supply the good by producing it in-house. The ﬁrms are
diﬀerent with respect to cost eﬃciency in production, implying that their
valuation of the contested prize also diﬀer. The net valuation for ﬁrm i is
given by
Vi = V − ci,i =1 ,...,n. (1)
where ci is ﬁrm i’s cost of producing the good. We rank the contestants
according to their net valuations, so that ci <c i+1,o rVi >V i+1.9
The probability of being awarded the prize depends on the relative up-
front eﬀorts of the contestants. Applying a standard Tullock framework10
9Net valuations are assumed to be common knowledge.
10See Tullock (1980).





where xi is ﬁrm i’s eﬀort (in monetary terms), while Sn :=
Pn
j=1 xj is total
eﬀort exerted by all active contestants.11 Expected proﬁts for ﬁrm i are thus
given by
πi = PiVi − xi. (3)









Contest eﬀort is monotonically increasing in net valuation for each player. In
our setting, this means that low-cost ﬁrms exert more eﬀort than high-cost
ﬁrms in the contest. By summing over n and re-arranging (4), assuming that














is the harmonic mean of the n ﬁrms’ valuations
of the contested prize.
It remains to ensure that all n agents will actually choose to participate
in the contest.12 Following Hillman and Riley (1989), we check whether ﬁrm
n +1has an incentive to contribute a positive amount of eﬀort, given that
the other n contestants expect that ﬁrm n +1will not contribute. Since πi
is concave in xi it suﬃces to evaluate ﬁrm (n +1 ) ’s contribution incentives
11This success function also arises from the more elaborate probability structure pre-
sented in Fullerton and McAfee (1999). Baye and Hoppe (2003) establish the strategic
equivalence between the Tullock model and a variety of research tournaments and patent
race games.
12In a perfectly symmetric contest, it is easily shown that all n ﬁrms will participate,
and that free entry implies n →∞ . Not so when the players’ valuations of the contested
prize diﬀer.
7at xn+1 =0 :
∂πn+1
∂xn+1






We see that ﬁrm n +1will only contribute if Vn+1 >S n. In the case of free
entry of contestants, this also provides the condition for the maximum num-
ber of ﬁrms that will enter the contest. Using (6), the number of contestants
in a free entry equilibrium is the n lowest-cost ﬁrms, where n is the lowest
integer that satisﬁes the following condition:






From (6) it also follows, as noted by Stein (2002), that total eﬀort is always
lower than the valuation of the active player with the lowest valuation of the
prize.13
A parametric example
For later comparison, consider the following example. Suppose, like Hill-
man and Riley (1989) do, that net valuations are geometrically decreasing,
such that Vi+1 = αVi, α<1. The net valuation of ﬁrm i c a nt h e nb e
characterized as
Vi = α
i−1v, α ∈ (0,1),v > 0. (8)
Using this speciﬁcation14 in (8), total eﬀort in the contest is given by
Sn =
v(n − 1)(1 − α)
α(α−n − 1)
. (9)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂Sn/∂n < 0, which complies with the
above-stated result that total contest eﬀo r ti sl o w e rt h a nt h el o w e s tv a l u a t i o n
among the active players in the contest.
13For a further discussion of equilibrium existence, see, e.g., Fullerton and McAfee
(1999).
14Equivalently, the production costs of ﬁrm i are given by ci = V − αi−1v.
83 Outsourcing
Now we depart from the standard set-up of the previous section to allow for
ex-post outsourcing of the awarded prize. More speciﬁcally, the winner of
the contest can subcontract, or outsource, some or all of the post-contest
production activities to one of its competitors. A realistic scenario would
be that only parts of the total production is outsourced (e.g., production of
some parts and components). Here, we assume — like Kamien et al. (1989)
do — that the winner can outsource the entire production of the good. This
assumption is only made for analytical clarity and does not qualitatively
aﬀect the main workings of the model.
In this model, incentives for ex post outsourcing arise from cost diﬀer-
ences in production. Thus, unless the lowest-cost ﬁrm (i.e., ﬁrm 1) wins the
contest, there will always be an incentive for ex-post outsourcing. The crucial
questions are to which ﬁrm the subcontract is allocated and how the price
of the subcontract is determined. As a starting point, we make the simple
assumption that the losers in the contest engage in a price competition for
being allotted the subcontract. In this case, the equilibrium price for the
subcontract is (marginally below) c2,a n dﬁrm 1 produces the good in all
cases.
With this assumption, all except the lowest-cost ﬁrm maximize
πi = Pi (V − c2) − xi,i =2 ,..,n. (10)
Thus, the possibility of ex post outsourcing increases the incentives for high-
cost ﬁrms to exert eﬀort in the contest. This applies even to ﬁrms with very
high costs, which would otherwise not have participated in the contest.
Firm 1 is diﬀerent since it can produce with costs c1,i fw i n n i n gt h e
contest. However, this ﬁrm also receives a positive payoﬀ if other ﬁrms win,
since it then gets paid c2 to produce the good for the winner. Expected
payoﬀsf o rﬁrm 1 are thus
π1 = P1 (V − c1)+( 1− P1)(c2 − c1) − x1,
9which can be re-arranged to
π1 = P1 (V − c2)+( c2 − c1) − x1. (11)
Because of the positive payoﬀ from others winning the contest, we see that
ﬁr m1a l s ob e h a v e si nt h ec o n t e s tas if it had costs c2. Accordingly, ﬁrm 1
has a lower incentive to exert eﬀo r tt ow i nt h ec o n t e s t ,c o m p a r e dw i t ht h e
benchmark case without the possibility of outsourcing.15
Since all ﬁrms perceive their costs to be c2,asymmetric equilibrium exists
and is given by16
xi =(
n − 1
n2 )(V − c2), (12)






(V − c2). (13)
We summarize the eﬀect of outsourcing on contest eﬀort incentives as follows:
Proposition 1 The possibility of ex post outsourcing, with price competition
for the subcontract, implies that all contestants exert the same level of eﬀort
in the contest.
Thus, ex post outsourcing with price competition levels the playing ﬁeld
completely with respect to the contest, and cost diﬀerences between ﬁrms do
not aﬀect the probability of winning. Furthermore, with respect to expected
proﬁts, only the production costs of the two most cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms matter.
For ﬁrms i ≥ 3,r e l a t i v ec o s te ﬃciencies are eﬀectually irrelevant. This follows
15Even though outsourcing reduces the eﬀort incentives of ﬁrm 1 in this and later appli-
cations, ﬁrm 1 always stays active. For the case of a fully discriminatory contest, Konrad
(2006) ﬁnds that cross ﬁrm shareholdings may make the ex ante best ﬁrm abstain from
bidding altogether.
16The result that ex post outsourcing with price competition leads to a perfectly symmet-





Contrary to the benchmark case, closed form solutions for the equilibrium may then be
obtained also for r 6=1 .
10from the assumption that the price of a subcontract is determined by price
competition.
How does the possibility of outsourcing aﬀect total contest outlays? Let
us ﬁrst consider the case where the number of active ﬁrms, n, is constant. In
this case, the eﬀect of outsourcing on total eﬀort is determined by how much
ﬁrm 1 reduces its eﬀort relative to how much the other ﬁrms may increase
their eﬀort. This, in turn, depends on the number of contestants and the
distribution of net valuations.
Proposition 2 With n contestants, ex post outsourcing with price competi-
tion increases total contest eﬀort if V2 > V n.
Proof. Follows from a trivial comparison of (5) and (13).
For n =2 , the net valuation of ﬁrm 2 must necessarily be lower than the
harmonic mean of the two players’ valuations. In this case, the net eﬀect
is simply that ﬁrm 1 has a lower incentive to win the contest (i.e., ﬁrm 1
behaves as if it has a lower net valuation), while the objective function of
ﬁrm 2 remains constant.17 Accordingly, total eﬀort drops.18 For n>2,
however, the eﬀect on total outlays is a priori ambiguous, and determined by
the condition given in Proposition 2. It is possible, though, to say something
general about the eﬀect of the number of contestants, n. By applying the
entry condition in the benchmark contest without outsourcing, we see that
V n is decreasing in n. It follows that a larger number of contestants will
increase the probability that outsourcing leads to higher total eﬀort in the
contest. This also makes intuitive sense, since a higher number of contestants
implies that there are more high-cost ﬁrms that have increased incentives to
exert eﬀort in the contest due to the possibility of ex post outsourcing.
17With only two players, price competition for the subcontract is equivalent to one of
the games considered by Kamien et al. (1989), where the terms of the subcontract is
determined by the loser of the initial contract.
18From (5) we can easily derive the eﬀect of a change in one player’s valuation on total






(n − 1)V 2
i
> 0.
11In the parametric example presented in the previous Section, total contest







A comparison of (9) and (14) conﬁrms that the possibility of outsourcing




The left-hand side of (15) is increasing in n, implying that outsourcing lead-
i n gt oh i g h e rc o n t e s te ﬀort is more likely the larger the number of ﬁrms
participating in the contest, as we would expect.19 In fact, a closer scrutiny
of (15) reveals that total eﬀort is always higher in the outsourcing regime if
n ≥ 3. This also tallies well with the results of Stein (2002), who ﬁnd that
more similar valuations generally increase total eﬀort in a Tullock contest.
Entry
The possibility of ex post outsourcing may not only aﬀect contest incen-
tives for a given number of ﬁrms, it may also greatly aﬀect entry of new
ﬁrms into the contest. From Proposition 1 we know that the eﬀect of out-
sourcing with price competition is to transform an asymmetric contest into
a symmetric one, which may trigger entry. We ﬁnd:
Proposition 3 Under free entry and an inﬁnite number of potential en-
trants, ex post outsourcing with price competition leads to
(i) increased entry of ﬁrms,
(ii) increased total contest eﬀort,
(iii) under-dissipation of the contested prize.
19An imbedded assumption is then that all n ﬁrms would actually participate in the
contest under free entry. However, since costs are symmetric for α =1(where all ﬁrms
want to participate in the contest), there always exists a range for α where a given number
of ﬁrms will want to participate in the non-outsourcing contest. In the contest with
outsourcing, all ﬁrms would like to participate.
12Proof. (i) With symmetric valuations, Vi = V i = V .F r o m( 7 )i tf o l l o w s
that ﬁrm n +1has an incentive to participate in the contest as long as
n−1
n < 1, which holds trivially for all n. (ii) Since free entry implies n →∞
in the contest with outsourcing, it follows from a comparison of (5) and (13)







From the entry condition in the asymmetric contest we know that, in equi-
librium, the right-hand side of (16) is decreasing in n. Thus, it suﬃces to
check for n =2 . In this case, the condition reduces to
V 2
2
V1+V2 > 0,w h i c h
is trivially true. (iii) In the free entry equilibrium, total contest outlays are




When outsourcing is possible, ﬁrms that would otherwise not ﬁnd it prof-
itable, will enter the contest if entry is free. Price competition for the subcon-
tract implies that the eﬀective cost of all ﬁrms except the most cost-eﬃcient,
is c2, which triggers entry of new ﬁrms. In a free entry equilibrium, this
means that total contest outlays increase. Furthermore, since own produc-
tion costs do not matter for expected proﬁts, an interesting implication of the
equilibrium derived in this Section is that ﬁrms that are not able proﬁtably
to produce the good themselves have incentives to participate in the contest
if they can outsource production to a lower-cost ﬁrm ex post.
Once more, we can illustrate our results by applying the parametric ex-
ample from Section 2. In the asymmetric contest without outsourcing,t h e
number of ﬁrms, n, participating in the contest under free entry is given by




(n − 1)(1 − α)
α(α−n − 1)
. (17)
Assume that α =0 .9. This yields n =5 , and total contest outlays in
equilibrium are approximately 0.64v. On the other hand, if these 5 ﬁrms
13enter the contest with the possibility of ex post outsourcing, total contest
eﬀort is given by (14), which in this example amounts to 0.72v. Finally, if
there are inﬁnitely many potential entrants to the contest, the possibility of
outsourcing produces a total contest outlay of 0.9v. Thus, outsourcing leads
to more rent dissipation, and the possibility of additional entry reinforces
this eﬀect.
Summing up, the results of this Section suggest that rent-seeking will
generally be higher with outsourcing than without. The only clear-cut case
to the contrary, is when there are only two potential contestants, in which
case contest eﬀort is certain to fall.
4 Nash bargaining
In the analysis thus far we have assumed that, in case of outsourcing, the
terms of the subcontract are determined by price competition among the
potential subcontractors. Although this is, in some sense, a natural assump-
tion, it also yields implications that might seem somewhat unrealistic. In
particular, it seems reasonable to argue that a ﬁrm’s own production costs
should somehow aﬀect its expected proﬁts in the contest. Furthermore, pure
price competition might be a particularly strong assumption in the case of
few contestants. For example, with only two contestants, price competition
for the subcontract implies that the losing ﬁrm unilaterally determines the
price of the subcontract, which is a somewhat extreme assumption. In order
to deal with these concerns, we relax the assumption of price competition
and assume that, in case of outsourcing, the terms of the subcontract is
determined in bilateral Nash bargaining.
Assume that, upon winning the contest, ﬁrm i (≥ 2) can go to only one
ﬁrm for negotiating a possible subcontract. This would be a reasonable
scenario if bargaining costs are high. We assume that the winner always
maximizes the total surplus of outsourcing by approaching ﬁrm 1 to negotiate
the terms of a subcontract, and that the payoﬀ to each party is given by
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. We let the bargaining power of
the contest winner be given by β ∈ (0,1). This implies that outsourcing
14transforms the eﬀective costs of ﬁrm i from ci to (1 − β)ci + βc1.20
Under these assumptions, the maximand of ﬁrm i ≥ 2 is
πi = Pi (V − (1 − β)ci − βc1) − xi,i =2 ,..,n, (18)
while ﬁrm 1 maximizes
π1 = P1 (V − c1)+( 1− β)
n X
i=2
[Pi (ci − c1)] − x1. (19)
The ﬁr s to b s e r v a t i o nw o r t hm a k i n gi st h a t ,u n l i k ef o rt h ec a s eo fp u r ep r i c e
competition for the subcontract, the contest is generally asymmetric. This
means that the participation condition given in (7) applies.
Maximizing (18) and (19), the ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrm 1 and for





















V − (1 − β)ci − βc1
¶¸
. (21)
Inserting (21) into (20) and aggregating, we arrive — after some manipu-












(ci − c1). (22)
We can summarize the characteristics of the contest equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 4 With ex post outsourcing and bilateral Nash bargaining for
the price of the subcontract, then
( i )t h ec o n t e s ti sa s y m m e t r i ci fβ<1 and n>2,
(ii) total contest eﬀort increases in β,
20This cost could also arise if, for instance, the contest winner were able to make a
credible take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to ﬁrm 1, but had to do a portion (1−β) of the production
himself.
15(iii) the contested prize is fully dissipated under free entry if β → 1.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from (18)-(22).
The bargaining parameter β plays a crucial role for the ﬁrms’ behavior
in the contest. From the payoﬀ functions and the ﬁrst-order conditions, we
s e et h a tah i g h e rv a l u eo fβ eﬀectually contributes to making the contest
more symmetric, which increases total eﬀort in the contest equilibrium. In-
tuitively, a higher value of β means that the lowest-cost ﬁrm gets stronger
incentives to win the contest, since the expected terms of the subcontract
will be worse, from ﬁrm 1’s viewpoint, if another ﬁrm wins the contest. On
the other hand, since a higher value of β implies that all other ﬁrms i ≥ 2
will have lower eﬀective costs if winning the contests, these ﬁrms are also
spurred to exert more contest eﬀort.21 In the limit case, β → 1,w h e r et h e
winner of the contest has all bargaining power in determining the price of





(V − c1). Thus, free
entry will contribute to full rent-dissipation if β → 1,s o m e t h i n gt h a tw a s
not possible with price competition for the subcontract.22
It is also clear that if n and β are suﬃciently low, outsourcing with
Nash bargaining can reduce total contest eﬀort compared with the case of
no outsourcing.23 For the special case of β =0 , rent-seeking is actually
reduced regardless of the number of ﬁrms. One might view this result with
some scepticism, though. If ﬁrm i wins the contest and has low bargaining
strength, the agreed price (and hence, the eﬀective cost of ﬁrm i) will be
close to ﬁrm i’s own costs, even though these may far exceed the production
costs of other low-cost ﬁrms. Incentives to bargain with other ﬁrms thus
naturally emerge. Let us therefore restrict attention to situations where the
21For the case of n =2 , we have already seen (the price competition case) that the two
ﬁrms have the same incentives to exert eﬀort for β =0 . An increase in β for n =2turns
out to increase the eﬀort incentives of both ﬁrms equally, and thus the contest remains
symmetric for all β ∈ (0,1).
22The extreme case of β → 1 corresponds to the other of the (two-player) games con-
sidered by Kamien et al. (1989), where the terms of the subcontract are determined by
the winner of the initial contract.
23For example, if n =2and β =0 , the price for the subcontract if ﬁrm 2 wins will
be identical under Nash bargaining and price competition. In this case, the terms of the
subcontract are eﬀectually determined by the loser of the contest, and we have already
seen that this reduces total eﬀort.
16agreed price is actually lower than or equal to c2,i . e . ,(1 − β)ci + βc1 ≤ c2.
This places a lower bound on β,g i v e nb yβ := (ci − c2)/(ci − c1).I f w e
let superscripts PC and NB denote price competition and Nash bargaining,























Thus, with the assumption that the bargained price should be better than
any feasible alternative, total contest eﬀort under Nash bargaining is never
less extensive than in the price-competition case.24
5 Contest design and welfare
Our setting does not only apply to R&D contests and lobbying/bribery games
that arise "naturally" through the potential for monopolization or patent
rights. Also one-oﬀ R&D contests that are speciﬁcally designed may be dis-
cussed using our model. From a policy perspective, should ex post outsourc-
ing of production be allowed?25,26 This is likely to depend on the nature and
24The somewhat ad-hoc assumption that the bargained outsourcing price should not
exceed any feasible alternative can be conceptualized by considering the following joint
bargaining/price competition framework. If ﬁrm 2 wins the contest, it enters into bar-
gaining with ﬁrm 1, since no other ﬁrm can oﬀer a more beneﬁcial outsourcing contract.
However, if any ﬁrm i ≥ 3 wins the contest, this ﬁr mm a yp l a yt h el o w e rc o s tﬁrms against
one another to obtain an outsourcing price of c2. Cooperative solutions may also be dis-
cussed, and a simple application of the Shapley value (determining ex post payoﬀs) to this
problem seems to conﬁrm the qualitative results found above.
25We are not discussing optimal design in this paper and the Tullock success function
should therefore be seen as capturing some real aspects of innovation technology (highest
eﬀort does not secure the most desirable plan). Allowing or disallowing outsourcing is
however a design instrument also in this case — and as it turns out, a potentially important
one at that.
26The reader may ask why the contest designer cannot set up the contest in separate
design and production stages so as to bypass the outsourcing issue and potentially do better
for himself. This, however, raises moral hazard concerns: Launching a design contest and
then auctioning out the production licence can give ﬁrms incentives to design a project in
such a way that it is very hard for the competitors to produce it. Furthermore, it may be
17interpretation of the contest. A widely used assumption in the contest design
literature is the maximization of total contest eﬀort. This seems a reasonable
approach in the context of an R&D tournament. The eﬀect of outsourcing
on total eﬀort has been analyzed in great detail in previous sections. The
discussion so far suggests that, by allowing for outsourcing, aggregate con-
test eﬀort increases if i) there are more than only a few potential contestants
and ii) the high cost ﬁrms have a fair degree of ex post bargaining strength
relative to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. With only two contestants, however, the
possibility of outsourcing reduces total eﬀort if the low-cost ﬁrm has suﬃcient
bargaining power. There may be more instruments available to the contest
administrator, though. In the ﬁrst part of this Section we extend the analysis
to consider also the case where a contest designer can collect entry fees from
the contestants, along the lines of Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
However, increased contest eﬀo r tm a yn o ta l w a y sbed e s i r a b l ef r o mav i e w -
point of social welfare. Bribery is an obvious example, but socially excessive
eﬀort is also a possibility in, say, a research contest. Long patent protection
or licensing periods (i.e., high prizes) may induce ineﬃciently high levels of
eﬀort, and in any case, higher eﬀort also means lower aggregate proﬁts. In
the extreme case, were all eﬀort is considered to be socially wasteful, the
relevant welfare measure is aggregate proﬁts. Outsourcing improves ex post
allocative eﬃciency, but it may also induce more wasteful eﬀort in the con-
test. In the latter part of this Section we highlight the trade-oﬀ between
improved allocative eﬃciency and potential excessive eﬀort, induced by ex
post outsourcing.
5.1 Entry fees
The analysis in this subsection is closely related to Fullerton and McAfee
(1999). They analyze a situation where the contest designer is able to collect
entry fees for participation in an R&D tournament, aiming to minimize the
costs of inducing a given level of eﬀort. Assuming a uniform entry fee, E,i f
of great importance to the producers to have unlimited access to the designers during the
production phase, something which is not likely to be the case if a rival of the designer
ﬁrm gets the production contract.
18the contest designer wants n ﬁrms to participate, he must choose the entry
fee such that ﬁrm n makes non-negative expected proﬁts while ﬁrm n +1
makes negative expected proﬁts. Of course, there is no reason to let the n’th
ﬁrm have any surplus, so the expected proﬁts of this ﬁrm equals the optimal
entry fee, i.e., πn = E. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) show that, for a large
class of contests, the optimal number of contestants which should be chosen
in order to induce a given total eﬀort at lowest possible procurement costs,
Ω := V − nE,i st w o . 27 Here, we extend their analysis by asking whether ex
post outsourcing should be allowed, restricting our attention to the two-ﬁrm
case.
Benchmark: No outsourcing
In the non-outsourcing benchmark case with two ﬁrms, the prize V needed
to induce aggregate contest eﬀort S, is given by
S =
(V − c1)(V − c2)
2V − c1 − c2
. (24)















The optimal entry fee is given by E = π2, yielding
E =




27The intuition goes as follows. A lower number of contestants increases the spending
(prize) needed to induce a given level of eﬀort, but this is outweighed by the possibility to
set higher entry fees due to higher expected proﬁts of the remaining contestants. Similar
results are found by Taylor (1995), Che and Gale (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
19where V is given by (25). Total procurement costs for inducing eﬀort S in
the benchmark case are then given by
Ω







(1 + 2λ) − 1












Now consider the possibility of allowing ex post outsourcing. With two
contestants, asymmetric Nash bargaining for the price of the subcontract en-
compasses all feasible possibilities, yielding outsourcing prices in the interval
[c1,c 2], depending on the bargaining parameter β. From (22), total contest




[V − c1 − (1 − β)(c2 − c1)]. (28)
Thus, inducing a level of eﬀort S necessitates a contest prize
V =2 S +( 1− β)c2 + βc1, (29)





Perhaps surprisingly, we see that inducing a given level of eﬀort always yields
the same proﬁts for ﬁrm 2, regardless of the ex post outsourcing arrange-
ments. In other words, regardless of the division of ex post surplus, if a
contest administrator wants to induce eﬀort S, the highest entry fee she can
take is S/2 to ensure that two ﬁrms will participate in the contest.
Total procurement costs with ex post outsourcing are then given by
Ω
NB = S + βc1 +( 1− β)c2. (31)
20The eﬀect of outsourcing on total procurement costs are given by a compar-
ison of (27) and (31). We see that ΩNB < ΩBM for all β ∈ (0,1) if the terms
in square brackets in (27) exceed 1. It is easily veriﬁed that this is always the
case.28 Thus, ex post outsourcing should always be allowed in the two-ﬁrm
case when the contest administrator can collect entry fees.
The intuition is as follows: Consider ﬁrst the case where β is relatively
high. Then outsourcing raises total contest eﬀort, due to increased eﬀort
incentives for the high-cost ﬁrm, implying that a given level of eﬀort can be
induced by oﬀering a lower prize. Furthermore, a larger share of aggregate
proﬁts can be captured by the entry fee. In the limit case of β → 1,b o t h
ﬁrms have the same expected proﬁts, all of which are captured by the optimal
entry fee. In sum, total procurement costs decline.
On the other hand, if β is relatively low, we know that outsourcing always
reduces total eﬀort, due to the reduced incentives of the low-cost ﬁrm to
exert eﬀort in the contest. This must be compensated for by a higher contest
prize, which — all else equal — increases total procurement costs. However,
the reduction of ﬁrm 1’s contest eﬀort raises the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 in
equilibrium, which implies that a higher entry fee can be collected while still
inducing ﬁrm 2 to participate in the contest. This more than oﬀsets the prize
increase, implying that total procurement costs decline also in this case.
We summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 5 With two contestants, the possibility of ex post outsourcing
reduces total procurement costs when entry fees can be collected.
5.2 Socially wasteful eﬀort
Finally, to deal with the question of socially wasteful eﬀort, we now make the
extreme assumption that all contest eﬀort is considered socially wasteful or
unwanted. We can think of such eﬀort as lobbying or bribery undertaken by







1+λ2 > 0.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that this expression has
a single positively valued maximum for λ = 3
4 and approaches zero in the limits (λ → 0
and λ →∞ ).
21ﬁrms in order to increase the probability of being awarded, e.g., a government
contract.29 Is the possibility of ex post outsourcing likely to be socially
beneﬁcial in this case?
When eﬀort is socially wasteful, the reasonable measure of social welfare
is expected aggregate proﬁts. The possibility of outsourcing improves ex
post allocative eﬃciency, which is unambiguously positive from a welfare
perspective. However, it may also increase incentives for socially wasteful
eﬀort. We can capture this trade-oﬀ by maintaining our two-ﬁrm example
with asymmetric Nash bargaining for the subcontract.
Without outsourcing, individual and total contest eﬀorts, respectively,






V (V − c1 − c2)+c2
1 + c2
2 − c1c2
2V − c1 − c2
. (32)
On the other hand, with ex post outsourcing, we saw in Section 4 that the
contest becomes perfectly symmetric with two ﬁrms. Total eﬀort is given by








[V − c1 +( 1− β)(c2 − c1)]. (33)



















For the special case of β =0 ,w h e r et h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm dictates the
terms of the subcontract, the possibility of ex post outsourcing unambigu-
ously improves social welfare. Wasteful eﬀort is reduced, due to the reduced
eﬀort incentives of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, and ex post allocative eﬃciency is
improved.
However, outsourcing is less likely to be socially beneﬁcial the higher is β.
29Clark and Riis (2000) study allocational eﬃciency in bribery contests for government
contracts. Ex post outsourcing of the contract is not an issue, though.
22The reason is that a higher level of β increases incentives for socially wasteful
eﬀort when ex post outsourcing is a possibility. More bargaining strength
to the least eﬃcient ﬁrm increases this ﬁrm’s net valuation of winning the
contest, with a corresponding stronger incentive to exert eﬀort. At the same
time, the low-cost ﬁrm also gets a stronger incentive to win the contest, since
ah i g h e rβ implies that the subcontract becomes less proﬁtable for this ﬁrm
if it does not win the contest.
From (34) we see that outsourcing will in fact reduce expected aggregate
proﬁts for suﬃciently high levels of β if
3(V − c2)
2V − c1 − c2
< 1, (35)
which can be expressed as
V − c2 <c 2 − c1. (36)
In words, this condition states that the net valuation of the high-cost ﬁrm
in the absence of outsourcing must be lower than the cost diﬀerence between
the ﬁrms. If this is the case, the high-cost ﬁrm has low incentives to exert
eﬀort in the contest, absent outsourcing, relative to the low-cost ﬁrm. Thus,
the probability that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm will win the contest anyway is
relatively high. This implies, in turn, that the improved allocative eﬃciency
due to outsourcing is relatively moderate, and outweighed by the eﬀect of
increased total eﬀort for suﬃciently high level of β. In other words, if V −c2 <
c2 − c1, there exists a critical value β
∗ < 1 such that outsourcing is socially
detrimental if β ∈ (β
∗,1).
6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the strategic eﬀects and implications of ex post outsourcing
in situations where competition between ﬁrms take on the characteristics of
an imperfectly discriminating contest for proﬁtable production contracts or
licences. While horizontal outsourcing is often thought to facilitate collusion,
23we have shown that such arrangements might instead increase competition
between ﬁrms in a majority of cases. With respect to contest design, whether
or not such competition is desirable depends both on the interpretation of the
model and the objective of the contest organizer. In a procurement contest,
allowing outsourcing might increase the quality of the procured good, for
example through higher R&D investments by the contestants, but it might
also increase incentives for lobbying and bribery.
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